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The Eastern European countries will enter into especially close economic relations with Western Europe and here especially with Germany and Austria. This will yield gains from trade and specialization for all and it will bring internal peace and general prosperity to Europe.
But there will also be problems because of the migration processes to be expected.
Although migration is good in principle, this is only true if it meets with flexible labour markets and if it is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state. This is the topic of this contribution. It deals with the policies in the Western European countries and in the EU itself that must be pursued in order to let market forces unfold thereby providing Europe with a maximum of welfare and social security and maintain it in view of the expected migration. In this context, the new EU constitution, which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union, will be of central importance.
Migration, wage differences and Eastern enlargement
Eastern enlargement of the European Union will create substantial pressures for migration, as wage differences are still immense at present, as shown in Figure 1 . In 2003, the average labour cost per hour in the accession countries was only 14% or one seventh of the west German labour cost per hour. Of course, due to the BalassaSamuelson effect, the purchasing power parity differences are significantly smaller: the 2 lower wages in the eastern European countries translate into lower prices for non-traded goods. However, even the differences in real wages are huge, in particular for migrant workers who save at least part of their earnings for future expenditure at home or who transfer the money to their families back home. Bulgaria and Romania are not among the present accession countries, but the wage ifferences that exist vis-à-vis the other countries may also give rise to massive locations of plants and migration pressures that will only be kept from exploding by dministrative restrictions during the initial seven years. In 2010, when the transition eriod will have ended and free movement of labour will prevail, there will still be great wage differences despite a certain convergence. To date, the convergence has been 1.1% p. a. in Western Europe, and empirically the maximum for very rapid adjustment processes is considered to be 2% p. a., as a rule of thumb. 1 At a maximum convergence rate of 2% p.a., wages of the accession countries will still amount to only 25% of west German wages in 2010 and 38% in 2020.
In an econometric study commissioned by the German Ministry of Labour, the Ifo
Institute projected that about 4% to 5% of the population of the countries joining the EU in 2004 will immigrate into the old EU countries within the next 15 years if immigration is not restricted. How large it will be with restrictions cannot be projected as the kind and the extent of the restrictions are not yet known. Lower figures are projected by Boeri and Brücker (2002) in a study commissioned by the EU, but this study inferred from the lack of reaction of migration to cyclical shocks that there will be little reaction to long-term wage differences, as criticised by Sinn and Werding (2001) .
As proof of only little migration pressure, some have pointed to the immigration from Spain and Portugal, comparing Eastern EU enlargement to Southern EU enlargement.
As migration to Germany was small at that time, a large movement of people from Eastern Europe is also not held to be likely. Intramarginal immigrants receive less. Therefore both sides stand to gain. This is still true if the subjective and objective costs of migration are taken into account, because these costs are considered by the immi advantage there would be no migration.
Of course, wages will change as a result of migration. In the country of origin they will rise because labour is getting scarcer, and in Western Europe they will fall as the supply of labour increases. They must fall because otherwise the firms would not be interested in providing the additional jobs needed by the immigrants.
Because of the change in wages there will also be losers in the West as the result of and of real estate as w 6 pressures of competition will belong to the winners, as demand rises for the factors of production they offer and they therefore benefit from higher prices and wages. In sum, e Western Europeans will gain from immigration, but only because the winners win oduces just as much value added as he costs. In al European GDP th more than the losers lose.
The reduction in wage differences between the country of origin and the country of destination is a necessary regulatory mechanism of the migration process, just as wages in general have a signalling and allocation function in a market economy. The shrinking wage differences will slow down the increase in the movement of people and will bring it to a halt at a point at which the wage difference is equal to the last immigrant's costs of migration. This immigrant is almost indifferent regarding his decision to migrate, and people with higher migration costs will prefer to stay at home. The equilibrating process will be supported by declining rents abroad and rising rents at home which both tend to reduce the gap in real wages.
At each point of time, the working population is optimally distributed between the countries involved. In Western Europe as well as in the country of origin, the firms will employ people until the last employee pr each country real wages will therefore equal the real marginal value product of the workers, and the wage difference measures also the addition to total European output resulting from the migration of one additional worker. Since the real wage difference just equals the migration cost of the last migrant, the addition to tot resulting from his migration is also just equal to these costs. The sum of the national products of both countries minus the migration costs of all those involved can no longer be changed by a bit more or less migration than the market would generate itself. This sum is maximized by the "invisible hand" of the market. 
Immigration into unemployment
The major prerequisite for welfare raising effects of migration is wage flexibility. Only if wages decline of those occupational groups to which the immigration occurs, will employers be willing to create new jobs for the immigrating people. Only in that case will there be additional output in the country of immigration and only in that case will it be possible for this additional output to more than offset the reduction in output in the The developments in the German labour market are due to the logic of the wage nals will be displaced to the etermined by those suppliers in the market who have the highest costs and replacement system and follow a very basic economic chain of effects. The wage replacement system of the welfare state itself is responsible for unemployment because it sets a minimum wage entitlement that a private employer has to meet in order for employment to pay for the worker. If this minimum wage entitlement exceeds the productivity of the jobs that would have to be created for full employment to exist, unemployment will result. If in this situation immigrants enter the labour market, who are willing to work at lower wages than the local wage earners because they are not or not fully eligible for wage replacement benefits until they will have worked long enough in Germany, then they will get the jobs and the natio extent that immigrants are available.
But there are no additional jobs because the immigrants will crowd only a fraction of the national labour force. The buffer for the decision whether to hire more or fewer people will only consist of the local unemployed who receive wage replacement benefits and therefore have high wage demands. This is not contradicted by the fact that over time the immigrants will also be eligible for wage replacement benefits, will also develop high wage demands and will themselves be pushed into unemployment.
One of the basic principles of the market economy is that the price and volume sold will only be d therefore demand the highest prices. If more low-cost suppliers enter the market, prices will decline and the quantity rise only if they have enough capacity to completely replace the high-cost suppliers. The same applies to the labour market. Those receiving wage replacement benefits from the welfare state are the high-cost suppliers in the sense that they stand to lose a lot by taking up a job and therefore have high wage demands. If result. It derives from the redistribution ctivity lower-cost suppliers enter the labour market, this will also have no effect on the volume of employment or the general wage level, but will result in the replacement of the highcost suppliers by the immigrants who will offer minimally lower wages or other small concessions in other areas of working conditions. Only after complete displacement would wages start declining and would it pay the firms to create additional jobs, but this case is not realistic for the labour market in view of the orders of magnitude involved.
5
The welfare state as an immigration magnet
Even if measures were taken to make the labour market more flexible and to permit immigration into new jobs rather than into unemployment, a second problem would stand in the way of an optimal migration activity of the welfare state. Since it is in the nature of the welfare state to take from the rich and give to the poor, immigration induced by wage differences is distorted. Skilled workers who would earn an above-average labour income in Western Europe must pay something like an entrance fee, whereas less skilled workers who would earn a belowaverage income in the West receive a kind of migration premium that increases the incentive to immigrate beyond what can be explained by wage and produ government set replacement incomes.
12 differences. For these reasons, the welfare state works like a two-pole magnet for the people who are willing to migrate. With one side it repels the rich net payers and with the other it pulls in the poor who rely on the state.
This redistribution occurs not only and not even essentially as a result of the instruments of social security, but primarily via regular budget items. The state levies taxes that rise in line with income, but it spends its funds more or less uniformly on everyone. Redistribution even occurs through the free availability of roads and bridges, of parks and public offices, of judges and policemen or of schools and universities.
Everybody can avail himself of these services, but some pay more for them than others.
To date, the immigrants have been predominantly unskilled, or at least people who could only earn a below-average income in Germany. For one, this is in the nature of ings as immigrants usually lack language skills. Then, too, it results from the forces of tivities of the state. Because of their low th selection developed by the redistribution ac income, the unskilled immigrants received, in addition to their value added, the redistribution gains of the state as a migration premium. Although they and their employers paid their taxes and social security contributions, they received more from the state than they had paid, and this effect was the stronger the lower the immigrants' skills and thus the lower their wages. The immigration magnet demonstrated its effects. bridges, parks, environmental protection, the courts, the administration, the police, fire fighters and the like. The findings of the study are presented in Table 1 Most public goods are impure public goods with congestion externalities. The utility of using roads, parks or the services of the police and the courts falls the more, the more users there are. Assuming that the jurisdictions providing the public goods operate at their optimal scale, it follows from the theorem of Mohring and Harwitz (1962) that the average cost of providing the public goods equals the marginal social congestion cost.
Thus, the cost estimates given in the The table shows that immigrants paid less into health insurance than they received from the state, but made high net payments into the pension insurance system, because the discounted value of their payments exceeded the pension claims established.
Unemployment insurance profited from those immigrants who had lived in Germany for less than 25 years and lost from those immigrants who had been in Germany longer than this. As the latter were not very numerous, unemployment insurance gained on balance.
But the immigrants paid less in taxes than they received in the form of tax-financed welfare benefits and public infrastructure services. In these areas the state experienced a big deficit. Table 1 Immigrants w uld realize, on a net gain from redistribution of annually 2,3 his net gain mium.
to the way the n system Thum's (2000) estimates for the German ion syste was axes immigrants to migrants will receive pensions whose present value is 45% of hat they contributed to the pension system (while Germans receive about 50%).
earlier draft of this paper that the ance could also take into account the implicit taxes paid by the children of immigrants. Indeed, as I argued and proved elsewhere (Sinn 1990 (Sinn , 1997 , the net fiscal externality of permanent immigrants who bring a whole dynasty of descendants into the country, equals the present value of the gross contributions of the first generation to the pension system. The basic reason is that the immigrants' pension will be financed by the children of the immigrants themselves. Razin and Sadka (1999) independently also showed this in paper that was based on a 1998 IMF working paper.
The last two lines of the table capture this effect by assuming that all immigrants will leave their descendants in the pension system. In that case, there is an additional benefit to the pension system of 1,126 euros per immigrant. This effect reduces the absolute value of the negative net fiscal externality, but does not change its sign for the group of immigrants who stay for less than ten years. The negative net fiscal externality in Unfortunately, as a rule, the immigrants did not stay long enough in Germany to become net payers. European guest worker migration typically is a return migration, unlike the permanent immigration of dynasties into the United States or Israel. About 60% of the immigrants surveyed had returned home after ten years, a of them participated in the official labour market. After 25 years more than 80% had either died or had returned to their home country. While no information on the destiny of the immigrants' children is available, it seems very plausible that the vast majority of immigrants who return home within a decade are not leaving their offspring in Germany.
Apart from that, the children of immigrants who stay in the country have a hard time reaching average incomes during their subsequent working years. Typically, the second generation of immigrants remain below-average wage earners and therefore also impose a burden on the redistributive state.
Overall, there can be little doubt that immigration involves quite substantial fiscal losses for the welfare state, notwithstanding the gains from trade effects immigration is bringing about. This is a fortiori true if account is taken of the fact that the cost of the unemployed, who were crowded out of their jobs by immigrants because the welfare state offers them attractive replacement incomes, has not been included in the above figures. If this cost had been added, the figures would be very much higher.
To date, the direct losses of the state due to the redistribution gains received by the immigrants have been bearable. However, at least in Germany the cost of unemployment has been enormous and has largely contributed to the country's financial difficulties and ensuing benefit cuts. This situation could be exacerbated by a rise in the ountries will enter a form of competition for deterrence vis-à-vis the economic refugees from Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. People willing to number of immigrants after the doors are opened to east Europeans which will be the case from 2011 onwards, at the latest, when the transition period for labour market integration ends. Other countries could then face similar difficulties and be forced to cut their benefits.
Welfare states' competition for deterrence
A reduction of welfare benefits is to be expected for the particular reason that the West European c emigrate from Eastern Europe will compare potential countries of destination and will focus on those with the best welfare systems. To be sure, the decision to emigrate is a serious personal decision with many non-economic elements, but the choice of where to go, once the decision to leave one's home country has been made, will depend in large rrence will ocesses. The states' reactions frequently take many years. But they are d by powerful forces that could, in the long term, significantly change the face of the elfare state of Western European character. Germany is presently thinking about er countries already did that in the past, measure on the economic conditions in the potential countries of destination.
In this situation, each potential country of destination is well advised to think about the welfare benefits it wants to offer. If it is too generous it will attract the "boarders" of the state and may have to expect substantial expenditures. Therefore each country may tend to try being stingier than its neighbours. If, however, all Western European countries try to be stingier than their neighbours, this competition for dete lead to a gradual erosion of the welfare state.
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This must be expected especially if migration is strengthened by network effects, that is, if it must be assumed that the initial immigrants from a certain country will be followed by their compatriots. The fear of network effects forces the welfare states in particular measure to beware of giving gifts to the migrants. What starts out as little gifts that can be financed may become financial burdens later on that are no longer bearable without a large-scale cutback of general welfare benefits. 8 To be sure, these are slow-moving pr le w reducing its excessive welfare expenditures. Oth and again others will follow. The competition for deterrence has already begun.
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It is possible that in these respects Europe will also gradually move in the direction of the United States that has no welfare state. The reason is not that Americans do not want one, rather that it could not survive the mobility of the people. In 1968, under Mayor Lindsey, New York City had tried to introduce more generous welfare rules along the European pattern, in order to get the poor off the streets. As a consequence, the poor to introduce a welfare state in the United
The first way would not be meaningful. It would not conform to the Treaty of event the welfare gains of migration as described above. The second from all over the country soon came to New York City and drove it to near bankruptcy.
At least, in 1975, the banks refused to extend additional credit to the City. This forced the politicians to retract and return to the harsh welfare rules that exist in the entire country to this day. Washington, D.C. had similar experiences when it had to cut back its initially generous welfare programmes because the costs caused by the inflow of poor people spiralled of control. The only way
States would be via actions of the federal government, but for such actions the necessary majority cannot be found. Individual states that want to introduce higher benefits cannot succeed if they act in a competitive fashion, without the co-ordination with others.
There are basically only three ways to prevent Europe from having to face similar developments.
1. The free movement of EU citizens is prohibited.
2. Immigrants are not or not immediately integrated into the welfare system of the country of destination.
3. The welfare systems are harmonized, preventing erosion by competition.
Rome and would pr 20 was proposed by the Scientific Advisory Council attached to the German Ministry of
Finance. This is a point to be dealt with later. The last way seems to be the solution being approached by the new EU constitution, whose draft was recently presented by the EU Constitutional Convention. This topic is so important for the future of Europe that a closer look at the draft is worthwhile.
The new EU constitution: Twenty mezzogiorni in Europe
The Constitutional Convention, chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French Article I-8, Citizenship of the Union:
additional to a national citizenship; it shall not replace (2) In the field of application of the Constitution, and without prejudice to any of its specific provisions,
(1) Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be it ) Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the onstitution. They shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; ... Article II-34, Social security and social assistance ) The Union recognizes and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and own by Union law and national laws and practices.
and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and pratices.
(3) In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises and respects the right to social free rity benefits and social fortunately, they also strengthen the forces of erosion via a competition for (2) Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.
These articles do not sound implausible at first reading. Union citizenship and choice of residency are essential steps for a united Europe, and who would want to discriminate against citizens of other EU countries? The connection between the prohibition of discrimination and Article II-34 may have dire consequences, however.
The constitution seems to say that a citizen of the Union may reside where he wants and that he is then entitled to the host country's full social secu advantages. And he must not be treated any differently from the nationals. The right to inclusion in the welfare state applies; so, in any case, says the legal jargon.
Although the above mentioned rights have already been granted before in Europe, by raising them to the level of constitutional rights they strengthen the idea of social inclusion. Un 22 deterrence à la United States, as described in the previous section. They truly create the rules that are to strengthen voke economic reactions of the tates.
itizens will be further expanded by the pplied to employed people. Those who change the country for reasons other than to xclusion applies. There is still some ambiguity as to the how the national governments will implement the new EU directive in detail. However, there can be little doubt that the migration decisions of job seekers will be distorted and that states will result. Eastern enlargement has increased a problem from which the West European welfare states have suffered for at least two decades. It is therefore more than likely that over the course of the next few decades the competition for deterrence will intensify and the benefits of the welfare states will continue to be reduced.
Under these conditions it is foreseeable that voices for a harmonization of the welfare rules in Europe will become louder, voices that are already to be heard from the social policy makers in all countries, who demand a social union for Europe in addition to economic and currency union. Such a harmonization would be in agreement with The substantial problems already experienced by Germany and Italy could become a chronic disease of Europe as a whole. The reason may be easily recognized in Figure 2 on: Delayed integration into the welfare system and home country principle
In order to prevent the described risks two measures are conceivable. First, the system of wage replacement incomes could largely be abolished, and a system of wage supplements or wage subsidies along the lines of the American "earned income tax credit" could be introduced instead. Wage subsidies are no lower bounds on wages, but nevertheless help to maintain the incomes of the poor. In addition, non-employed people should not be included in the social system of the host country but continue to demand support from their home countries. They could migrate wherever they want within the EU, but once they become needy without having worked there, they should be supported by their countries of origin. This would be sufficient, at least at the constitutional level, to establish the home country p
Of course, the political chances for such a modification of the constitution are slim.
However, European parliaments should know what they vote for if they ratify the constitution in its present form. Should there be opposition to the constitution by one country there would be a chance to reconsider the case and modi before a second ratification round is begun.
The EU firmly holds on to a confirmation of the social inclusion rules that overly comfortable with the idea of free migra The EU Commission's proposal is not convincing for two reasons. Firstly, it only offers a temporary chance to influence the migration flows. The transition period after EU accession of the East European countries will pass quickly, and even therea West European welfare state will maintain its function of immigration magnet for unskilled Eastern Europeans. 12 Delayed integration and contrast, offer a permanent solution against welfare migration, because each immigrating individual is assigned an integration period during which he is only partially integrated. It works like a permanent brake on an excessive effect of the welfare state as immigration magnet and thus as a measure to protect this welfare state.
Secondly, from an economic point of vie means to optimize the migration process. The people to be permitted to come are See Husemann (2002) . 12 Furthermore, as previously described, the Hungarian and Polish wages will only amount to one third speed of 2% per annum. This, too, will keep up the migration pressure.
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of west German wages and less than half of east German wages, even at a maximum convergence 29 determined according to some rigid rules. Someone must stand at the gate and make a selection. It is doubtful whether, after such a selection, it is really those with the lowest subjective and objective migration costs who will come and who may be expected to achieve the highest productivity gain by changing their country of residency. Even the best bureaucrat cannot hope to match the market's selection ability. If he could, the planned economy would be as good as the market economy. The selection of productive activities from the large quantity of possible activities is the most important reason for the superiority of the market economy over the planned economy. To deny the market regarding such an important issue as the international migration of labour would really be a bad decision. Instead of distributing gifts to those selected by the state, it is much better, from an economic point of view, not to distribute any gifts for which the state has no money anyway, and to let EU citizens decide for themselves whether to migrate or not. Such a liberal solution would also agree much more with the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, which demands, among other things, the entirely free movement of all EU citizens. 
